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Abstract: The factors behind the increase in the relative wages of skilled workers in developing countries 
are still not well understood. The authors use data from Peru to analyze the determinants of within-
industry share of skilled workers. They use a translog cost function for gross output and are therefore able 
to incorporate the effects of materials, both domestic and imported, in addition to capital. The authors 
find that capital accumulation can explain a large fraction of the increase in the wage bill share and 
relative wages of skilled labor. This finding is contrary to the commonly held view that unobservable 
technological change is responsible for the rising skill premium in both developing and developed 
economies. A test for separability indicates that a gross output cost function is the appropriate one to use, 
and therefore share equations based on value-added cost functions could be misspecified. 
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Introduction 
Many developing countries have experienced an increase in the relative wages of skilled 
workers following trade liberalization, as has been well documented by now (see, for example, 
Robbins 1996, Wood 1997, and Hanson and Harrison 1999). Since this is contrary to the 
predictions of standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, skilled biased technological change has 
been cited as a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
1 The fact that the rise in the skill 
premium has been observed in developing countries as well has also been interpreted as an 
additional piece of evidence to support the claim that it is technology rather than trade that is 
driving the rise in relative wages in the industrialized world (Berman and Machin 2000). 
 
A common way to demonstrate that skilled biased technological change has taken place 
is to show that the share of skilled workers in the wage bill within industries has increased over 
time (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994 and Berman and Machin 2000). If the overall wage 
share of skilled workers in the economy is increasing due to trade, then one would expect to see 
that reallocations of labor between industries (from those with a low wage share of skilled 
workers to those with higher wage shares) driving this shift. On the other hand, if technology 
were the culprit, then these shares would be changing in the favor of skilled workers within 
                                                 
1 Other explanations include Davis (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996). Davis argues that middle-income 
countries may be competing with low-income countries in a world with multiple cones of specialization, and so 
trade could reduce relative wages in these middle-income developing countries. According to Feenstra and Hanson, 
capital flows from the North to the South could increase the relative demand for skilled labor in both regions. 
 industries. The papers cited above find that most the changes can be explained by within-
industry changes.
2  
Changes in the wage share of skilled labor within industries can be a good measure of 
shifts in relative demand. An increase in the wage share of skilled labor in the face of a rising 
skilled wage premium will indicate a shift in favor of this type of labor if we assume that the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than 1. The literature cited in the previous paragraph has 
attributed these wage share changes to technology. However, within-industry changes in the 
share can be driven by factors other than technology. Since technological change is not directly 
observable, the studies mentioned above interpret the residual component of share changes that 
cannot be explained by measurable factors as the effects of technology.
3 The factors other than 
technology that could also influence the shares of skilled and unskilled labor include capital and 
materials. Skilled labor could be more complementary with physical capital than unskilled labor. 
Griliches (1969) formalized the hypothesis for such capital-skill complementarity and provided 
evidence for it. Krusell et al. (2000), in fact, argue that capital-skill complementarity can explain 
most of the change in the share of skilled labor in the United States (a view that is contrary to the 
rest of the literature). It is also possible for materials to affect the share of skilled labor. For 
example, material imports could substitute for unskilled labor in industrialized nations, as 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) point out. While the effect of imported materials could go the other 
way in developing countries, it may be necessary to take them into account to avoid 
misspecification. 
  
                                                 
2 Within-industry changes in developing countries are stronger in the 1980s compared to the 1970s (Berman and 
Machin 2000). 
3 Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) do relate changes in share to indicators of technology such as investment in 
computers and R&D. 
  2So far, the effects of these other factors on changes in shares have been found to be small. 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) find that while capital can explain some of the change in 
favor of skilled workers, it is able to account for only a small fraction of the shift. Berman and 
Machin (2000) also find that changes in capital intensity do not explain much. The effect of 
materials is usually not incorporated in these studies since they are based on cost functions for 
value added. Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) try to take into account the effect of materials 
but find it to be unimportant. 
 
The objective of this paper is to explore in detail the factors behind the increase in 
relative demand for skilled labor in a developing country: Peru. Our measure of relative demand 
will be the within-industry share of skilled labor. Specifically, we want to see how much of the 
increase in relative demand is being driven by measured factors such as capital and materials 
compared to unobservable technology. It is interesting to conduct this exercise for developing 
countries for two reasons. First, capital accumulation is likely to be higher in developing 
countries compared to industrialized nations. If there are capital-skill complementarities then it is 
possible that capital accumulation can explain a larger fraction of the increase in demand for 
skilled labor in these countries compared to developed countries. The sample in the Berman and 
Machin paper does include developing countries. However, our paper conducts a more detailed 
analysis of the capital-skill complementarity issue in the following ways. We estimate the 
coefficient for capital intensity for Peru instead of using a calibrated coefficient from the 
literature, as they do. Also, our data include information at a more disaggregated industry level, 
and we take into account the effects of materials. The second reason looking at developing 
country data may be interesting is that trade liberalization is likely to stimulate investment in 
  3these countries since a significant fraction of equipment in developing countries has to be 
imported. If capital-skill complementarities are found to be important, then trade may increase 
the relative demand for skilled workers via this mechanism. 
 
A paper closely related to ours is that of Pavcnik (2003). She uses Chilean plant level 
data from the late 1970s to the 1980s to analyze the determinants of the rising share of skilled 
workers and finds that investment played some role (she does not find any evidence that foreign 
technology had an effect). Our results are consistent with her findings, although we look at a 
more recent time period (the 1990s) for Peru.
4 We find strong evidence for capital-skill 
complementarity. We estimate the contribution of capital accumulation to the increase in the 
overall wage share and relative wages of skilled workers and find it to be important. One way 
our analysis differs from hers is that we take into account the role of materials using a gross 
output cost function while Pavcnik uses a value added cost function as does most of the 
literature. Pavcnik does look at the effect of imported materials but it is introduced as an 
indicator of foreign technology. As we discuss in the paper, gross output based cost functions 
may be more appropriate. In that case the effect of imported materials has a different 
interpretation from the one in her paper.  
 
Our main results are as follow. We find that increases in capital intensity are strongly and 
positively related to increases in the wage share of skilled workers. Capital accumulation can 
explain a large portion of the increase in share and relative wages of skilled labor. A test for 
separability indicates that a gross output cost function is the appropriate one to use. Share 
equations based on value added cost functions could suffer from misspecification. 
  4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief history of 
reforms in Peru in the early 1990s. It also presents the trends in wages and employment in Peru 
and shows that there has indeed been a shift in labor demand in favor of skilled labor during the 
decade of the 1990s. Section III presents the basic theoretical framework that provides the main 
determinants of the shares of skilled and unskilled workers in factor payments. Changes in these 
shares are interpreted as measures of relative demand shifts. The equation to be estimated and the 
estimation method are discussed in this section.  Section IV describes the data and the results and 
shows that capital accumulation can explain a large fraction of the shift in demand in favor of 
skilled workers. The last section contains our conclusions. 
 
II. Reforms overview and trends in wages and employment 
Reforms in Peru 
Like many other developing countries during the last two decades, Peru implemented 
drastic reforms in early 1990s. President Alberto Fujimori came to power in 1990 and 
implemented wide ranging structural reforms. His government eliminated price controls, 
subsidies, and foreign exchange restrictions. A flexible exchange rate was adopted in August 
1990. There was a significant liberalization of the foreign trade regime and the average level of 
tariffs was reduced sharply, from 66 percent in 1989 to 15 percent in 1995 and to 12 percent in 
1997. Import prohibitions, which were extensively used in the 1970s and the late 1980s, were 
gradually abandoned. Export restrictions were eliminated for most exports in 1991. There was 
also a substantial privatization drive and tax reform. After a recession in 1992, the country 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Also, we use industry-level data since plant level data were not available for Peru. 
  5experienced GDP annual growth rates of more than 7 percent in the following five years. 
Inflation was much lower (with an average annual rate of around 20 percent) during this period.  
 
Along with these reforms, Peru was one of the few countries in Latin America to 
implement significant reforms in the labor markets.
5 These reforms were focused on lowering 
worker dismissal costs, facilitating temporary hiring, and introducing flexibility in formal 
employment. 
 
Prior to labor reform, labor legislation was extremely complex and included a wide range 
of regulations, such as binding minimum wage policies, extremely high dismissal costs, 
administrative controls, and specific compulsory benefits, which introduced a series of 
distortions in labor markets. Peruvian labor legislation was modified through successive steps. 
The Law of Employment Promotion (Ley de Fomento al Empleo) of 1991 along with a new 
constitution in 1993 introduced several measures to reduce labor market rigidities. Later in 1995, 
new regulations followed to deepen the flexibility in labor markets. Consequently, workers’ 
dismissal costs declined sharply through the progressive elimination of job security regulations, 
the introduction of temporary contracts, and changes in the severance payment structure. 
 
Most of the effects of labor reform took place in 1991, and by 1995 labor markets seemed 
to have adjusted to new regulations. For example, the share of workers in private formal wage 
employment under temporary contracts increased from 20 percent in 1991 to 31 percent in 1992 
                                                 
5 According to the 2004 Inter-American Development Bank report, only six countries implemented significant labor 
reforms between the mid-1980s and 1999: Argentina (1991), Colombia (1991), Guatemala (1990), Panama (1995), 
Peru (1991), and Venezuela (1998).  
  6and then to 40 percent in 1995. The increase from 1995 to 1997 was small (4 percentage points) 
compared to earlier years (Saavedra and Torero 2000). 
 
Trends in wages and employment 
In our paper, we focus on the period 1994–2000 after the major labor market reforms had 
already taken place so that we may abstract from their effects. Focusing on this period also has 
the advantage that labor markets are closer to being competitive, which is the basis of our 
conceptual framework. 
 
The dataset we use (described in greater detail in Section IV) has data on white- and blue-
collar workers for the manufacturing sector. White-collar workers (empleados) and blue-collar 
workers (obreros) will be interpreted as skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. Table 1 reports 
data on wages and employment of both types of workers for the manufacturing sector in Peru 
during 1994–2000. The relative wages of skilled workers increase from 2.04 to 2.52 over this 
period. Relative employment of skilled workers fell slightly, from 0.66 to 0.64. The share of 
skilled workers in total wages increased from 0.57 to 0.62 over this period. The real wages of 
unskilled workers actually declined over this period while that of skilled workers increased by 
about 20 percent. 
 
It is interesting to compare these trends with data for the United States, an industrialized 
country. The annual increase in the skilled wage share (0.75 percentage points) in Peru between 
1994 and 2000 is very similar to that of the United States between 1979 and 1987 (see Berman, 
Bound, and Griliches 1994).  The increase in relative wages is also comparable. The increase in 
  7relative wages in Peru implies that wages of skilled workers increased 3.5 percentage points 
faster per year than wages of unskilled workers. According to Bound and Johnson (1992), the 
relative wages of male college graduates in the United States to those of high school dropouts 
with less than 10 years of experience increased from 1.58 to 2.19 over the 1979–1988 period. 
This implies that wages of college graduates in the United States increased 3.6 percentage points 
per year faster than that of high school dropouts. On other hand, the ratio of employment of 
skilled workers increased in the United States during the 1979–1987 period (see Berman, Bound, 
and Griliches 1994) while we do not see much of a change in this ratio in Peru in the 1990s. 
 
A substantial increase in the relative wages of skilled workers without a significant fall in 
the ratio of employment indicates an increase in the relative demand for this group of workers.
6 
We can use the methodology employed by Katz and Murphy (1992) to check whether there was 
indeed an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers and to estimate its size. If we 




where ω is the relative wage (of skilled to unskilled), n is the relative employment, period 1 is 
the latter period, σ is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled, and D is the 
increase in relative demand for skilled labor. 
 
                                                 
6  The relative supply of skilled workers in Peru was fairly stable during this period. Calculations based on data 
reported by International Labor Organization (2004) show that the relative supply of skilled workers either fell 
slightly or increased slightly depending on the definition of skilled workers. 
  8The estimates of σ for the United States reported in Hammermesh (1986) range from 
0.49 to 3.7.
7 Applying these estimates to the equation above and using the numbers on relative 
wages and employment in Table 1, we obtain estimates of D that range from 7 to 73 percent over 
the entire 1994–2000 period. An average of the two estimates of elasticity (i.e., 2.1) yields D = 
40 percent. There has, therefore, indeed been a significant shift in demand in favor of skilled 
labor. 
 
As Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) point out, changes in the wage bill share of 
skilled labor are a good measure of relative demand shifts as long as the elasticity of substitution 
is greater than 1. We will focus on this measure in this paper. We perform a between-within 
decomposition of the wage bill share of the manufacturing sector to see if changes in the overall 
wage share of skilled labor are due to shifts across industries or changes within industries. The 
standard way to decompose these changes is as follows: 
 
i i i i S P P S S ' ' ' ∆ + ∆ = ∆ ∑ ∑  
 
where   is the wage share of skilled workers for the manufacturing sector as whole,   i s  t h e  
skilled wage share in industry i, P
' S i S'
i is the share of industry i in total wages. A bar over a variable 
denotes the mean over the time period. 
 
The results of the decomposition are reported in Table 2. As is clear from the table, the 
change in the overall skilled share is due solely to within-industry changes. The between- 
                                                 
7 These estimates are those obtained from cost function studies and are related to the substitution between all 
  9industry change is actually negative.
8 That is, it will be worthwhile to explore the factors behind 
these within-industry changes if one wants to understand the relative demand shifts. 
 
As mentioned before, it is possible that the changes in these shares are driven by 
measured factors such as capital and materials. Figure 1 shows the trends in these factors over 
time for the manufacturing sector in Peru. It is clear that capital stock has grown at a much faster 
rate compared to the other variables.
9 This is different from the United States experience where 
the capital intensity did not change much over the 1979–87 period. The very large increase in 
capital intensity in Peru could, therefore, also be responsible for the increase in the share of 
skilled workers.  
 
III. Conceptual Framework 
Our estimation is based on a quasi-fixed cost function for gross output. We use the cost 
function for gross output to take into account the effect of materials, which could also influence 
labor shares. The cost function is used to derive equations involving shares of skilled and 
unskilled workers in factor payments (all variable factors). The estimates from these equations 
will then be used to make predictions about changes in shares in the wage bill. The quasi-fixed 
cost function assumes that some of the inputs are fixed and the quantities of the variable inputs 
are chosen to minimize costs. We will assume that the quasi-fixed or variable cost function takes 
the translog form (see Brown and Christensen 1981) such as the following: 
                                                                                                                                                             
production and non-production workers. 
8 While the shares in output and employment of unskilled labor intensive industries like textiles and garments did 
increase during this period, there is no clear pattern in general between skill intensity and changes in industry shares. 
9 Capital intensity, as measured by the capital to value added ratio, increased from 0.74 to 1.38 from 1994 to 2000. 
Such large increases in capital intensity have been observed in other developing countries as well. Roberts (1996), 
for example, reports that the average capital output ratio of manufacturing industries in Colombia more than doubled 
between 1977 and 1985. 
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where Y is gross output, Pi is price of variable input i, Zi is the quantity of fixed input i, and A 
measures the level of technology. 
 
  We assume that there are four variable inputs and one fixed input. The variable inputs are 
skilled labor, unskilled labor, domestic materials, and imported materials. The fixed input is 
capital. 
 
 The  derivative  dln CV/dln Pi will equal the share (Si) of the variable factor i in variable 
cost. Therefore we have 
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where   is the share of factor i in total payments to variable factors. The first equality in (2) 
comes from the assumption of cost minimization while the second equality comes from taking 
derivatives of equation (1). 
i S
 
  11We need to assume  ij ji γ γ =  so that the cross partials of the translog cost function with 
respect to the log of prices are the same. We also need  0 = ∑
j
ij γ for the cost function to be 
homogeneous of degree one in input prices. If we impose constant returns to scale then we will 
have  .  0 = +∑
j
ij Yi ρ ρ
 
We will assume that ln A takes the form 
kt t k t A ln ε β β + + =           ( 3 )  
where k denotes industry, t denotes time, and kt ε  is a random error term. 
 
The technology term has industry, time, and random components. We will assume that 
t β  is positive, i.e., technology improves over time. Equation (2) can then be rewritten as 




ij Yi i i i i i ε α β α β α ρ γ ρ α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ . (2') 
 
  Let us look at the expression for the error term (within parentheses) in equation (2') above 
(the industry and the time subscripts have been omitted from the other variables for the sake of 
clarity). The first term is an industry specific term. The second term is a function of time and will 
be negatively related to time variable if  0 <
i AP α . A negative 
i AP α  will imply that technological 
change is biased against factor i. The last term within parentheses is a random term. 
 
  12 Equation  (2') can therefore be estimated using an industry fixed effect, a time trend, log 
of price indices of the variable inputs, and the log of capital and gross output. The actual 
equation to be estimated (after imposing all necessary constraints) takes the form 
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where w denotes wage, the subscripts S and U denote skilled and unskilled labor, respectively; p 
denotes price of materials, the subscripts D and M denote domestic and imported, respectively; 
and K denotes capital.   
 
  We have an equation for each of the four variable factors: skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
imported materials, and domestic materials. These equations will be estimated as a system. Only 
three of these equations will be linearly independent. We will drop the share equation involving 
domestic materials and estimate the remaining three using iterative Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR). Since the iterative procedure is used, the estimates will not be sensitive to 
the equation being dropped. One point to note is that we assume that there is no correlation 
between capital and shocks affecting factor shares. This is reasonable since the capital stock for 
year T does not include investment in year T. While the latter could be correlated with year T 
shocks, the capital stock should not. Also, investment may not respond to year-to-year shocks 




  13IV. Data and Results 
Data 
Our data come from the Annual Survey of Manufactures for Peru collected by Ministerio 
de Industria, Turismo, Integracion y Negociaciones Comerciales Internacionales (MITINCI). 
The data are available at the four-digit ISIC (Rev. 3) level and includes information on 
employment, wages, value added, materials, investment, and capital stock for firms with five or 
more workers. The data are available from 1994 to 2000.
10 The survey covers approximately 90 
percent of the gross value of production of 1994, the base year. 
 
The survey has information on white-collar and blue-collar workers and, as mentioned 
before, we interpret these as skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. To compute payments to 
these two types of workers, we take into account both wage and non-wage payments. The wage 
payments are available for each type of worker. The non-wage payments are not available 
separately for the two types of workers and so are allocated to each type according to their share 
in the wage bill. Non-wage payments include health plan payments, accident insurance 
payments, manufacturing training fund payments (SENATI), contributions to the national 
housing fund (FONAVI), tenure bonus payments, and Christmas and national holiday bonuses. 
 
We constructed price indices for materials to get estimates of the quantities of materials, 
both domestic and imported. We were able to obtain these indices only at the level of input-
output (IO) industries for Peru. Both domestic and import price indices (base year 1994) were 
available at the IO level from the Compendio Estadístico, published by the National Institute of 
                                                 
10 Previous surveys cover the period from 1988 to 1992. However, the data from these years are not easily 
comparable to that of the latter period because of changes in industry classification. 
  14Statistics and Information (INEI). The 1994 IO table for Peru gives the flows of both 
domestically produced commodities as well as imports into each industry. A price index for 
materials was constructed by taking the weighted average of the price indices of commodities 
with the 1994 shares of each commodity in total intermediate use as weights.
11 Separate price 
indices were computed for domestic and imported materials to deflate these two variables. The 
payments to these factors were the nominal values of these variables.
12 
 
We employed a perpetual inventory method to obtain estimates of the capital stock. That 
is, the beginning of period capital stock in period t,  , is given by  t K
 
1 1 ) 1 ( − − + − = t t t I K K δ , 
 
where δ is the depreciation rate and I is investment (at base year prices). The depreciation rate 
used for equipment was 12.3 percent and for structures was 3.6 percent (based on United States 
data from Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni 1999, ch. 4). The initial capital stock used was the 
one available for 1994 from the survey.
13 
                                                 
11 Note that this is the same as a Tornqvist chain price index assuming the shares of each commodity in total 
intermediate use stay the same over time. The Tornqvist chain price index is computed as follows: 
) it p / it p ln( ) it s
t i
it s ( .
p
T p
ln 1 1 5 0
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where t=1 to T, s is the value share of commodity i (see Kohli, ch. 8). 
12 These also include taxes on fuels. Taxes on fuels were allocated to domestic and imported materials according to 
their shares in total material use. 
13 The survey reports the end-of-year capital stock and investment during that year. The beginning-of-year capital 
stock for 1994 was estimated using the end-of-year capital stock, and investment data for 1994, and the depreciation 
rates. The capital stock for subsequent years was estimated using the perpetual inventory method mentioned before. 
One problem with the capital data for 1994 is that the survey reports the capital stock data at book value. This can 
introduce both upward and downward biases in the capital stock measure. The capital stock may be overstated since 
depreciation is not taken into account. The stock may be understated since investment acquired in years prior to 
1994 will be valued at the prices of the years they were acquired instead of 1994 prices and prices tend to increase 
over time (see Roberts 1996). The problem may be alleviated somewhat by the fixed effects.  
  15 
The wage rates on the right hand side of equation (2'') were calculated at the level of 
manufacturing sector as whole for each year (obtained as total wage payments divided by total 
employment). The assumption here is that wages are the same across industries due to mobility 
of both types of labor, which has been the standard practice in the literature.
14 Wages, therefore, 
vary only across time (however, the wage shares, which are the dependent variables in the 
system of equations, do vary across both industry and time). The wage variables used in the 
regression are indices with 1994 as the base year. 
 
Estimation 
The sample period for all regressions is 1995–2000.
15 Before we estimate equation (2'') 
we run a regression involving the share of skilled workers in the total wage bill as the dependent 
variable. This has been the standard way to analyze the determinants of the changing share of 
skilled workers (see, for example, Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994 and Pavcnik 2003). The 
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where S' is the share of skilled workers in total wage bill; wS and wU are wages of skilled and 
unskilled labor, respectively; K is capital; and V is value added. 
 
                                                 
14 Since observed wages do differ across industries, the implicit assumption here is that such variations arise from 
differences in quality and that the quality adjusted wage is the same across industries. Actual industry wages cannot 
be used in the regression since they are endogenous. 
15 We do not include 1994 in our sample since the mismeasurement problem is likely to be more severe with the 
capital stock data for 1994. 
  16  The theoretical basis of the equation is a quasi-fixed translog cost function for value 
added with the usual homogeneity restrictions and constant returns to scale assumption imposed. 
Capital is taken to be the fixed input while the two types of labor are variable. The results of this 
estimation, with and without a time trend, are reported in Table 3b. The capital to value added 
ratio is significant at the 10 percent level. The time variable is positively related to the skilled 
share but is not significant.  
 
One problem with this specification could be that the production function is not separable 
between labor and capital variables on one hand and materials on the other. The equation could, 
therefore, be misspecified. We will show later that the null hypothesis of separability is rejected 
by the data. 
 
We now go back to the share equations based on our framework involving a gross output 
cost function. Equation (2'') gives us a system of equations, one for each variable factor of 
production. Before we estimate the entire system of equations, we estimate an equation involving 
the difference in the share of skilled workers and unskilled workers using equation (2''). That is, 
we estimate an equation of the form 
() ( ) l n ( ) l n
() l n () l n
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  17The results are reported in the first column of Table 4b. The capital-output ratio is highly 
correlated with the difference between skilled and skilled wage share. An increase in the capital 
to output ratio of 10 percent will increase the difference in the share by 0.1 percentage points, 
which is about 4 percent of the mean share difference. 
 
Figure 2 plots the change in the difference between skilled and unskilled wage against 
change in the log of capital to gross output ratio over the period 1995–2000. There is a very clear 
positive relationship between the two variables. 
 
We next run the system of equations described by (2'') using iterative SURE. The results 
for the skilled and unskilled wage share equations are reported in the last two columns of Table 
4b.  Both skilled and unskilled wage shares are positively related to the capital to output ratio. 
However, the point estimate is higher in the skilled wage share regression. The difference in the 
estimates between the skilled and unskilled wage share is 0.011, which is consistent with the 
results of estimation of equation (4) involving the difference in shares. It is interesting to note 
that technological change, as measured by the time variable, has been biased against both skilled 
and unskilled workers. The negative bias is stronger for unskilled workers. The time trend is, 
however, not significantly related to the difference in shares, as reported in the first column of 
this table. It is also interesting to note that the relative price of imported materials is actually 
positively related to the skilled wage share, indicating these two factors may be substitutes. 
 
Unskilled wage shares appear to increase with a decrease in price of imported materials. 
All this is consistent with the hypothesis that imported materials may embody skilled labor for 
  18developing countries. The coefficients for price of imported materials are, however, not 
significant. The imported material price is significant at the 10 percent level, however, in the 
regression involving the difference in the shares (reported in the first column of this table). 
 
How much can capital accumulation explain?  
We want to estimate how much of the increase in share of skilled workers and their 
relative wages over the 1995–2000 period can be explained by accumulation of capital. The 
share of skilled workers in the wage bill is equal to SS /(SS+SU), where SS and SU are the shares of 
skilled and unskilled workers in the payments to all variable factors. We estimate the changes in 
the skilled and unskilled shares in variable factor payments between 1995–2000 predicted by the 
increase in the capital to gross output ratio for each industry using the results of the SUR 
regression reported in Table 4b. These estimates are then used to obtain the corresponding 
changes in skilled share in the wage bill. The actual and estimated mean changes (across 
industries) of the skilled share in the wage bill are reported in the first panel of Table 5. As can 
be seen, capital accumulation can explain almost the entire increase in the mean wage bill share 
of skilled workers. 
 
We also want to estimate how much of the increase in the share of skilled workers in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole can be explained by increases in capital intensity (as measured 
by the capital to gross output ratio). Increases in the capital stock have increased the within- 
industry wage shares of skilled labor. As was shown in Section II, the change in the overall share 
of skilled workers in the wage bill of the manufacturing sector can be decomposed into a within- 
industry component and a between-industry component. We want to see how much capital 
  19accumulation has contributed to the within-industry component. This contribution is equal to 
∑ ∆ i i S P ' ˆ , where  i P  is the mean (over the time period) share of industry i in total wages and 
∆  is the predicted share of skilled labor in the wage bill for industry i, obtained using the 
coefficients of the SUR regression and changes in capital intensity (calculation of these share 
changes was described in the previous paragraph). That is, we calculate the weighted sum of the 
changes in the skilled wage share predicted by capital accumulation. This contribution and the 
actual change in the skilled wage share in the manufacturing sector are reported in the second 
panel of Table 5. Increases in capital intensity explain close to 40 percent of the increase in the 
skilled wage share in the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
i S' ˆ
 
We also want to see how much of the increase in relative wages in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole can be explained by increases in capital. This is done by using the fact that 
∆log(wS/wU)=∆log( ) - ∆log(n U S S S ' / ' S/nU), where w denotes wage,   denotes share in wage bill 
and n denotes employment. We can estimate how much the relative wages would have to change 
given the changes in the shares of skilled and unskilled workers predicted by increases in capital 
intensity. We take the change in the (log) employment ratio as given and equal to the actual 
change. The predicted and actual changes in (log) relative wages are reported in the last panel of 
Table 5. Capital intensity increases explain close to 50 percent of the actual change in relative 




As mentioned before, share equations based on value added function could be 
misspecified since the assumption of separability may not be valid. This could be one reason 
  20why we see a weaker relationship between capital intensity and skilled labor demand in the share 
equation involving value added. Table 6 compares the change in the wage share of skilled labor 
that can be explained by the value added regressions (reported in Table 3b) with the change that 
can be accounted for by the gross output regressions. The mean change predicted by the value 
added regression
16 is about 60 percent of the mean change predicted by the gross output 
regression. The change predicted by the value added regressions for the manufacturing sector as 
a whole is about two-thirds of that predicted by the gross output regressions. It is useful, 
therefore, to conduct a test for separability. 
 
We can have a value added function that depends only on capital and labor only if the 
gross output function is of the form   
) ), , , ( ( ) , , , ( M K U S V Y M K U S Y = , 
where Y is gross output, V is real value added, S, U, and K are skilled labor, unskilled labor and 
capital, respectively and M is a vector of materials (domestic and imported).  
 
The cost function will be separable between the prices of labor and capital inputs on one 
hand and material inputs prices on the other if the production function is separable with respect 
to these two sets of inputs (as shown above). A cost function, c, is said to be separable with 











                                                 
16 The change for each industry is obtained by multiplying the coefficient for capital intensity reported in Table 3b 
with the change in the log of capital to value added ratio of that industry. The method for obtaining changes 
predicted by the gross output regression has been explained above. 
  21where the subscripts for the cost function denote partial derivatives, j and k denote inputs 
belonging to one subset resulting from the partition, and pM is the price of input m belonging to 
the other subset (see Kohli 1991, ch. 4). That is, the ratio of quantities of inputs belonging to one 
subset of the partition should be independent of the prices of inputs of the other subset. This 
would require —e.g., in the case where capital (K) and labor (L) are separable from materials 
(M)—  LM KM σ σ = , where σ  denotes the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution. 
 
The condition stated above refers to the total cost function where all inputs are variable. 
Since we estimate a quasi-fixed cost function, we need to relate our estimates to the parameters 
of the total cost function. Brown and Christensen (1981) show how this can be done. It can be 
shown that a sufficient condition for separability to hold for the system of equations described by 
(2'') is  0 SM UM SD UD KM γ γγγρ == === . 
 
We test this restriction using the likelihood ratio test. The results are reported in Table 7. 
The likelihood ratio statistic is 18.3, which is greater than the critical value of the  distribution 
at the 1 percent level. The null hypothesis that the separability restrictions hold is therefore 





We show in this paper that there has been a substantial shift in demand in favor of skilled 
workers in Peru during the latter half the 1990s. This increase in demand has been observed in 
other developing countries as well in recent years. There is a widely held view that unobserved 
  22skilled biased technological change is behind this development. We show in this paper that 
capital accumulation can explain a large portion of this shift towards skilled labor in Peru. Also, 
increased availability of imported materials seems to decrease the relative demand for skilled 
workers, perhaps because materials that are imported into a developing country such as Peru 
embody skilled labor.  
 
The shift in demand towards skilled labor has been observed in both developing and 
developed countries. While there are similarities associated with this phenomenon between these 
two sets of countries, there could be important differences. We observe, for example, that the 
employment ratio has not changed much in Peru while that is not the case in the United States. 
Also, there is a sharp increase in capital intensity in Peru, which we do not observe in the United 
States. The latter difference could account for why we see that capital accumulation can explain 
a large fraction of the shift in demand towards skilled labor in Peru but not in the United States. 
One implication of our results is that if trade stimulates investment in developing countries then 
it could also increase the relative demand for skilled labor in the presence of strong capital-skill 
complementarities. 
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  25Table 1 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Skilled to unskilled 
wage ratio  2.040 2.252 2.189 2.302 2.381 2.382 2.528 
Skilled to unskilled 
employment ratio  0.656 0.663 0.663 0.642 0.638 0.633 0.640 
Skilled share 
in wage bill  0.572 0.599 0.592 0.596 0.603 0.601 0.618 
Skilled real 
annual wages 
(1994 nuevos soles) 
14605 16347 15906 16701 16990 17095 17662 
Unskilled real 
annual wages 
(1994 nuevos soles) 
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Table 3a Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Skilled share in wage bill  0.58 0.11 0.27 0.92 
Skilled to unskilled workers 
 relative wage  0.87 0.04 0.81 0.94 
Capital to value added 





Dependent Variable: Skilled Share in Wage Bill (with Industry Dummies)  
  Reg. 1  Reg. 2 








Time    0.002 
(0.003) 
R
2 (adjusted)  0.77 0.77 
N  552 552 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at 10 percent level. 
  27Table 4a. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Skilled share – unskilled share  
in payments to variable factors  0.027 0.048 -0.18  0.28 
Skilled share in payments to variable 
factors  0.093 0.046 0.008 0.32 
Unskilled share in payments to variable 
factors  0.067 0.039 0.011 0.29 
Imported materials share in gross 
output  0.18 0.15  0  0.62 
Ln (skilled wage/ price of domestic 
material)  0.22  0.09 -0.16 0.44 
Ln (unskilled wage/ price of domestic 
material)  0.087  0.074 -0.365 0.292 
Ln (price imported mat./price domestic 
mat.)  0.023  0.08 -0.347 0.53 
Ln (capital/gross output)  -1.51 0.79 -7.19 0.41 
 
Table 4b. 
 OLS  Iterative  SURE 
 
Dep var: 
Skilled - unskilled 
share in payments to 
variable factors 
Dep var: Skilled 
share in 




in payments to 
variable factors




































R squared  0.78 0.81  0.79 
N  552 552  552 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.   
*** and * significant at 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 5 
Contribution of Increases in Capital Intensity to Changes in Skilled Labor Share in Wage Bill 
and Relative Wages 
Actual mean change (across industries) in skilled share in wage bill  0.014
 
Estimated mean change in skilled share in wage bill from increases in 
capital intensity  0.011
 
Actual change in the skilled share in wage bill of the manufacturing sector 0.024
 
Estimated change in the skilled share in wage bill of the manufacturing 
sector from increases in capital intensity  0.009
 
Actual change in the log of skilled to unskilled wage ratio of the 
manufacturing sector  0.12
 
Estimated change in the log of skilled to unskilled wage ratio of the 
manufacturing sector from increases in capital intensity  0.058
 
 
  29Table 6 
Changes in Skilled Labor Share Predicted by Valued Added Regressions versus 
Changes Predicted by Gross Output Regressions 
Estimated mean change in skilled share in wage bill from value added 
regression  0.007
 
Estimated mean change in skilled share in wage bill from gross output 
regression 0.011
 
Estimated change in the skilled share in wage bill of the manufacturing 
sector from value added regression  0.006
 
Estimated change in the skilled share in wage bill of the manufacturing 





Test for Separability of Production Function 
Likelihood ratio: 18.3 
Number of restrictions: 5 
09 . 15 :
2
5 , 01 . χ  
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
unskilled skilled capital value added dom.mat. imp.mat.
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Figure 2. Correlation Between Skilled and Unskilled Wage Share 
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